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THIRD PARTY RECORDS PROTECTION ON THE 
MODEL OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
MARC JONATHAN BLITZ* 
Introduction 
In his famous dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, Justice 
Brandeis warned that as technology advanced, liberty would face new 
dangers never imagined by the Framers.1  When the first Congress enacted 
the Fourth Amendment, for example, the chief bulwark against government 
spying lay in the sanctity of the home—and the Constitution’s ban on 
entering it without a warrant.2  By stopping officials from arbitrary 
“breaking and entry,” the Fourth Amendment stopped them from gaining 
“possession of [a person’s] papers and other articles incident to his private 
life.”3  But technology, wrote Brandeis, would likely provide government 
spies with another route into an individual’s inner thoughts and intimate 
activities.  “Ways may some day be developed by which the government, 
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, 
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home.”4   
Brandeis was, of course, correct.  Secret papers are no longer confined to 
the interior of wooden or metal drawers.   They now often take the form of 
electronic files that can be easily copied, transmitted, stored, or searched en 
masse.5  And government officials who want a digital copy are not always 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; J.D. University of Chicago 
(2001); Ph.D. (Political Science) University of Chicago (2001), B.A. Harvard University 
(1989).  Thanks to Professor Stephen Henderson for organizing this Symposium and to him, 
Professor Joseph Thai, and to my fellow Symposium participants—Thomas Crocker, 
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 1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in 
part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 3. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. at 474. 
 5. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD 
PARTY RECORDS 2 (2013) [hereinafter LEATPR Standards] (“[W]ith the maturation of 
digital storage and search technologies, and virtually costless distributions, we now live in a 
world of ubiquitous third party information”); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: 
THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 3 (2007) (finding that 
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forced to obtain one from an individual’s computer.  They can often get the 
same information from the many third party entities with whom modern 
Americans constantly share such information: the companies that provide 
our cell phone service, Internet service, credit cards, or insurance policies. 
Even where an individual does not consciously create a record of her 
preferences and minute-to-minute choices, an Internet or other technology 
company will often create such a record for her.6  Electronic book 
companies, for example, keep detailed records of which books an individual 
reads, the pages she reads, passages she highlights in each book, and notes 
she records in the margin.7  Music and Internet video companies can 
likewise generate detailed records of what television shows, movies, or 
other media content are watched or listened to on a particular computer—
and for how long and how often.8  In short, as Stephen Henderson writes, 
“[W]e now live in a world of ubiquitous third party information,”9 
embracing everything from our conversations with friends, to our 
encounters with books and other reading materials, to our commercial 
transactions.10  
The challenge that this state of affairs creates for courts and lawmakers is 
even more difficult than Brandeis imagined.  When Brandeis insisted the 
courts stand ready to protect the “secret drawers” in a person’s home, he 
could insist that such legal protection be strong and unyielding.  As English 
                                                                                                                 
records of transactions with hospitals, banks, stores, schools, and other institutions, usually 
found only in file cabinets until the 1980s, are now much more readily obtained with the 
advent of computers and the Internet).  Individual Standards will be referred to using the 
format ‘STANDARD x-x.’ 
 6. See Sara M. Watson, The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All into Activity 
Hackers, WIRED (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-
the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/ (explaining 
how Apple SmartPhones might create records of activity the user is unaware that he or she is 
creating).  
 7. See NICOLE A. OZER & JENNIFER A. LYNCH, PROTECTING READER PRIVACY IN 
DIGITAL BOOKS 3 (2010). 
 8. See Andrew Leonard, How Netflix Is Turning Viewers into Puppets, SALON (Feb. 1, 
2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/02/01/how_netflix_is_turning_viewers_into_puppets/ (“Net-
flix doesn’t know merely what we’re watching, but when, where and with what kind of device 
we’re watching. It keeps a record of every time we pause the action—or rewind, or fast-
forward—and how many of us abandon a show entirely after watching for a few minutes.”); see 
also Bill Brennar, Spotify Is a Danger to Privacy Lovers and I Don’t Care, CSO ONLINE (Oct. 6, 
2011), http://blogs.csoonline.com/1736/spotify_is_a_danger_to_privacy_lovers_and_i_dont_care. 
 9. Stephen E. Henderson, After United States  v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment 
Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 431, 435-36 (2013). 
 10. Id. 
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lawyers have insisted since before the founding of the American republic, a 
man’s house is “his castle”11 and a realm that must, in most cases, remain 
immune to government entry except where officials have a warrant 
supported by probable cause.12  Such a legal barrier against official 
investigation cannot, however, plausibly encircle every one of the 
numerous records that modern individuals generate in their interactions 
with phone companies, financial entities, and other organizations.   
Many such records form a critical part of law enforcement 
investigation13—often before police can obtain the probable cause they 
need to conduct more intrusive searches, such as the search of a home or a 
wiretap.  Police may be tipped off to the possibility of criminal activity, for 
example, by an unusual pattern of travel movements or financial 
transactions.14  If such information were as strongly walled off from police 
examination as the details of in-home activity, law enforcement 
investigations might rarely get off the ground.  Fourth Amendment privacy 
protection accorded to the home tends to be invariable—treating “all 
details” as “intimate details.”15  By contrast, this probably cannot be true of 
the privacy protection that lawmakers give to diverse records of individual 
activity.  Such records protection has to vary, based upon the types of 
records involved or on other circumstances that affect individuals’ 
expectations about the records’ privacy or their likely importance in law 
enforcement investigations. 
Moreover, such a nuanced scheme for records privacy cannot be found in 
contemporary Fourth Amendment law.  While the Court has squarely 
addressed the challenge of adapting the Fourth Amendment to 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 945 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the seventeenth century English jurist Lord Edward Coke explained that “a 
man’s home was his castle”); Comer v. Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary, No. 2:13-CV-0003, 
2013 WL 1721126, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2013) (noting that “[t]he maxim that a man’s 
home is ‘his castle’ has deep roots in English law . . . [and] has long been a cherished part of 
American law”). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“It is a ‘basic 
principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a 
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 
(2004))). 
 13. See STANDARD 25-3.2 commentary (“‘[R]ecords searches’—in which law 
enforcement obtains evidence of crime via records maintained by institutional third parties—
are surely one of the most important investigatory activities.”). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
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technological invasions of the home,16 it has not taken the same approach to 
the challenge of protecting “secret papers” generated and stored outside the 
home.  Rather, under its “third party doctrine,” the Court has found that 
when we share records with third parties, we “assume the risk” those 
records might then be passed onto government officials (whether 
voluntarily or in response to a subpoena).17  In short, under the third party 
doctrine, government is not barred by the Fourth Amendment from 
obtaining information we have put within its reach by sharing it with 
business entities (such as banks or phone companies).  
Of course, legislators are free to fill the gap that the Court left in this 
aspect of its Fourth Amendment law—they can take up the challenge of 
protecting the records that the Court’s Fourth Amendment law has left 
unprotected.  If and when they do, they will find an invaluable template in 
the American Bar Association’s new Standards for Law Enforcement 
Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards).  The centerpiece of 
these standards is a tiered system of privacy protection that directly 
addresses the complexity just discussed, whereby different records must be 
given distinctive levels of protection.  In short, the LEATPR Standards 
advise that lawmakers should strive to categorize each set of records 
according to their “degree of privacy,”18 classifying them as “highly 
private,” “moderately private,” “minimally private,” or “not private.”19  
Once a set of records receives a category designation, a corresponding level 
of protection then follows.  Only records in the highest tier of privacy 
receive a level of protection akin to that which the Fourth Amendment 
establishes for wiretaps or searches of the home: namely, the requirement 
that police receive a court order based upon probable cause.20  Access to 
moderately private records, by contrast, should require a court order based 
only upon reasonable suspicion (or in some cases, an even lower threshold 
of suspicion).21  Minimally private records should be accessible to police 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64  (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting 
that the majority opinion in Berger “overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. United States, and its 
offspring, and brings wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping fully within the 
purview of the Fourth Amendment” (internal citations omitted)); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. 
 17. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1976) (noting that telephone subscribers 
realize that the phone company has technology and reasons to record their calls); see also 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor could not 
expect that his financial records would retain their privacy once he shared them with a bank). 
 18. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 10. 
 19. Id.; see also STANDARD 25-4.1; STANDARD 25-4.2 (emphasis omitted).  
 20. STANDARD 25-5.3. 
 21. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/4
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without the approval of the courts at all, as long as a prosecutor or other 
agency official has some basis for believing the records have relevance to 
the law enforcement effort for which they are sought.22  And records that 
are not private should be available at any time to police pursuing a 
“legitimate law enforcement purpose.”23  
This system has a number of advantages as a template for legislatures 
and agencies.  By designing a system whereby law enforcement’s path of 
least resistance leads them to initially non-private or minimally private 
records, the Standards help encourage law enforcement practices in which 
officials refrain (where possible) from too hastily intruding into records 
about the more intimate areas of life.  They also provide guidance on how 
lawmakers should assign types of records to different tiers—about what 
factors might help them tell if a record should be classified as “highly” or 
“moderately” private and receive its attendant protections, or remain 
accessible to police even without a court order. 
Here, however, the Standards meet the challenge of providing nuance, 
and do so too successfully.  As the Standards themselves note, apart from a 
few paradigmatic cases of private information, such as medical records, 
“there are few bright lines in privacy.”24 Information that might seem 
“highly private” to one person, might seem “minimally private” to 
another—and while the Standards’ factors provide a way to begin 
addressing the classification challenge in an orderly fashion, the same 
individuals who disagree in their intuitions about privacy are likely to differ 
in how they apply the factors, and with what results.   
This article therefore proposes a rethinking of the Standards’ set of 
factors.  It proposes modeling it on another familiar framework which, like 
the Standards, aims at “striking” a “delicate balance” between government 
power and individual freedom25—between the need for government to 
regulate and the need for individuals to continue to have insulated spaces, 
in the midst of such regulation, in which they are largely free to organize 
their own lives in their own way.  More specifically, the model that strikes 
this balance in constitutional law consists of requiring the government to 
meet tiers of scrutiny—“strict scrutiny” where the individual liberty interest 
is strongest, “minimal scrutiny” (or “rational basis”) where it is weakest and 
the government therefore most free to regulate, and “intermediate scrutiny” 
for the territory in between where the need for liberty and the need for 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary. 
 25. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (Cowen, J., dissenting).  
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regulation are of comparable strength (or the balance is, at least initially, 
largely unclear).26  
In some respects, the Standards’ own system of tiers closely resembles 
the courts’ system of tiers for protecting liberties in constitutional law.  
However, there are important differences, and my central thesis in this 
article is that, while the Standards cannot and should not simply adopt the 
constitutional scrutiny unchanged, or simply substitute it for their own 
(justifiable) category choices, they can benefit by borrowing from the 
scrutiny-based system in certain ways.   
One respect in which heightened scrutiny provides a model is that courts 
do not, as a general matter, use a complex multifactor test to divide the 
realm of strict scrutiny from that of intermediate and minimal scrutiny.27  
The dividing lines, while in some cases certainly contestable, are clearer 
than that.  They cannot be identical to the lines that divide up our 
informational lives, but they can provide a model.28  We might, for 
example, begin in privacy law as courts do in cases applying judicial 
scrutiny to laws limiting individual liberties, by most strongly insulating the 
realms of life over which the government has the least business exercising 
control—the realms where we form or exchange our opinions and where we 
engage in intimate activities.  Traditions and norms of privacy may then 
move these initial lines—giving the government greater power to monitor 
realms of communication, and perhaps lesser power, in some cases, to 
regulate the financial or physical realm where government normally has a 
greater role to play in assuring safety and market fairness.  But the starting 
point, at least, is clearer than a set of factors that different audiences will 
interpret in very different ways. 
There is also a second benefit to treating heightened scrutiny as a model: 
not only would it help legislators, courts, and agencies to better apply the 
Standards’ tiers of privacy, it would also help lawmakers to refine—and 
make more practicable—the corresponding tiers of protection.  The 
Standards currently take account of this law enforcement interest chiefly by 
making it clear that officials are able to gain access to records of any kind, 
as long as they meet whatever standard of suspicion corresponds to the 
records’ privacy: probable cause for highly private records, reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See generally 1 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11:3 (3d ed. 
2013).  
 27. See infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part II.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/4
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suspicion for moderately protected records, relevance for minimally private 
records, and no burden at all for records that are not private.29  
These four tiers of protection, taken alone, however, do not take 
adequate account of the possibility that law enforcement may sometimes 
need to obtain even highly or moderately private information more easily 
than the Standards permit.  So the Standards also suggest, at various points, 
that the hurdles facing law enforcement may be lowered even further.  They 
may be lowered, for example, to meet an emergency,30 or, more generally, 
in any situation where the burden imposed by their multi-tier privacy 
protection system “would render law enforcement unable to solve or 
prevent an unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or preventable 
crime.”31  
But such a provision offers little guidance.  It simply emphasizes that 
there may be times when legislators will be reasonable in setting aside the 
guidance given in the Standards’ multi-tier protection system.  While it is 
probably impossible to completely specify ahead of time exactly when and 
where law enforcement will face challenges that require faster and more 
data analysis than the Standards allow, it is better to try to identify and 
more carefully define those circumstances, instead of simply including a 
general escape hatch that may well grow into an exception that swallows 
the Standards’ earlier rules. 
Again, the model of heightened scrutiny suggests a valuable corrective.  
Under strict scrutiny in First Amendment cases, for example, even where 
government has a sufficiently compelling need to limit speech, it must still 
adopt a “narrowly tailored” means of imposing such a limit.32  Applied to 
the realm of records protection, such a model would require not only that 
law enforcement show that they have a genuine need for quick access to 
certain records, but that they will satisfy this need in a way that avoids 
unnecessary damage to individuals’ privacy interests. 
Part I elaborates on the value of the four-tier privacy categorization 
scheme in the LEATPR.  While some are likely to criticize these Standards 
as being insufficiently nuanced, this Part argues that simplification in this 
case is probably valuable and unavoidable.  Part II next draws on First 
Amendment law and other areas where the court uses heightened scrutiny 
                                                                                                                 
 29. STANDARD 25-5.3. 
 30. STANDARD 25-5.4. 
 31. STANDARD 25-4.2. 
 32. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 
(2011) (noting that laws burdening political speech must not only meet a compelling interest 
but also must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve that interest).  
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to rethink the Standards’ four-factor analysis for assigning types of records 
to tiers of privacy.  Part III then turns from the Standards’ tiers of privacy to 
its tiers of protection.  This part examines how this system of protection 
might be refined by incorporating elements of the scrutiny-based 
classification scheme one finds in First Amendment case law, and its 
similarity with the minimization requirements (or factors) one finds 
respectively in wiretapping and special needs jurisprudence.   
I. Tiers of Privacy and the Need for Simplification 
Any attempt to divide our activities into four tiers of privacy will 
inevitably simplify a complex world.  Individuals’ intuitions about degrees 
of privacy will often be more nuanced, allowing them, for example, to find 
some “moderately private” records more sensitive (and potentially 
embarrassing) than other “moderately private” records.  Moreover, different 
individuals will sometimes have starkly different judgments about what 
kinds of activities are private.  This is clear in the fact that while some 
people are outraged when computer applications broadcast their music or 
reading choices to the world, others are happy to let Facebook tell their 
friends (and perhaps others) about every song they listen to and every 
newspaper article they read.33  
The simplification inherent in the Standards’ tiers of privacy is thus 
likely to be targeted by some critics of the Standards.  But I want to begin 
this article’s analysis by explaining why, on the whole, such simplification 
is not only justified but also probably necessary. 
First, law is filled with categorization schemes that necessarily sacrifice 
some of life’s complexity in order to provide judges with administrable 
rules and make it more likely that the rules will be applied predictably and 
consistently.  Consider, for example, two areas of constitutional law where 
courts have opted to adopt a three- or two-tier scheme instead of trying to 
place a person’s liberty or equality interests along a precise point on a 
flowing continuum.  I have already mentioned one of these above: the 
tradition of subjecting government measures that implicate certain First or 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to strict, intermediate, or minimal scrutiny.  
For example, in Equal Protection contexts, the Court subjects government 
classifications based on race or ethnicity to strict scrutiny,34 classifications 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Danah Boyd & Eszter Hargittai, Facebook Privacy Settings: Who Cares?, FIRST 
MONDAY (Aug. 2, 2010), http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3086/2589.  
 34. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003) (“All government racial 
classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”); Regents of 
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based on gender or illegitimacy to intermediate scrutiny,35 and other 
classifications to minimal scrutiny.36  Strict scrutiny is the most demanding, 
permitting government regulation of a subject only where it can show its 
restriction is “necessary” and “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest.”37  Intermediate scrutiny is somewhat more 
permissive, allowing regulation even if the government’s interest is 
“important” or “significant” rather than a “compelling” interest of the 
highest order, and also allowing a less than perfect fit between the 
government’s goal and the means it uses to achieve it.38  It requires only a 
“substantial” relationship between the two.39  Finally, minimal scrutiny—or 
“rational basis”—is the most permissible of the three and leaves the 
government with plenty of leeway to regulate, allowing it to do so 
whenever it has any “legitimate governmental objective,” even a minor one, 
and uses means “rationally related” to that objective, even if the 
government regulates far more then necessary.40 
In adhering to this three-tier scheme, the Court has rejected occasional 
calls for a more nuanced approach—among them Justice Stevens’ claim 
                                                                                                                 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort 
are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”). 
 35. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives.”); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric 
and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 296 n.119 (2010) (collecting 
cases).    
 36. See, e.g., Phila. Police & Fire Ass’n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of 
Phila., 874 F.2d 156, 163 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the “general rule” in Equal Protection 
Clause analysis is that—except for a few types of government classifications, such as those 
based on race or gender—classifications receive only “minimal scrutiny”). 
 37. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Under strict scrutiny, all racial classifications are categorically prohibited 
unless they are ‘necessary to further a compelling governmental interest’ and ‘narrowly 
tailored to that end.’” (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005))); Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 299 (stating that, where government is permitted to impose a burden on the 
individual under strict scrutiny, the burden must be “precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest”). 
 38. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”); Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 296 n.119 (noting that use of such classifications 
involves application of “intermediate scrutiny”). 
 39. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
 40. See, e.g., Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F.2d 738, 753 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that under “minimal scrutiny. . . . the classification challenged need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest”). 
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that the Court should acknowledge that its Equal Protection cases “reflect a 
continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have 
been explained in opinions by terms ranging from ‘strict scrutiny’ at one 
extreme to ‘rational basis’ at the other,”41 and Justice Marshall’s call for a 
sliding scale approach which likewise varies according to the 
“constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected 
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular 
classification is drawn.”42  
In the First Amendment context, the Court has likewise opted for 
categories instead of continua in public forum doctrine, the strand of free 
speech law that bars government from silencing speakers indirectly by 
driving them out of streets, parks, or other public space.43  To be sure, the 
courts cannot simply prevent government from regulating public space.  
Such regulation is necessary to control traffic, protect the environment, and 
accomplish numerous other tasks.  So the Court has, under “public forum” 
doctrine, divided public space into “public forums,” (e.g., streets and parks) 
where government’s interests in regulation must often be trumped by 
speakers’ interests in free and robust communication,44 and “non-public 
forums,”(e.g., airports) where other public interests, like the need for safe 
and efficient air travel, trump speakers’ freedom.45   
Like the three tiers of scrutiny, the simple categorization in forum 
analysis has been challenged.46  Indeed, before settling into the modern 
                                                                                                                 
 41. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
 42. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 43. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 46 (1st Cir. 2007) (Lipez, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “access to public spaces to speak on matters of public concern has 
long been a concomitant privilege of the right of expression” and this right has included the 
right of speakers to use “streets and other public places”). 
 44. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) 
(describing the different types of forums). 
 45. Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) 
(describing the different categories of forums and concluding that airport terminals “are 
nonpublic fora”); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) 
(describing the features of different types of forums and finding a fundraiser for federal 
employees to be non-public). 
 46. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 199 (1995) (stating that public forum doctrine prevents “sensitive First 
Amendment analysis”); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of 
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 1219 (1984). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/4
2014]        THIRD PARTY RECORDS PROTECTION 757 
 
 
public forum approach, the Court hinted it might approach such issues by 
simply performing a particularized contextual analysis of each public space 
in which the government regulated speech: in each case, it would look at 
“[t]he nature of a place” and “the pattern of its normal activities” and ask 
whether the speech restricted by the government was “incompatible with 
the normal activity of a particular place.”47  Instead of this highly 
contextualized inquiry, however, the Court opted to simplify matters.  It 
categorized public space into two major types—and accorded different 
levels of protection to each type.  In public forums, speakers’ interests in 
use of public space received extraordinary protection.  By contrast, in non-
public forums, speech interests were subordinated to other public needs. 
As I have pointed out elsewhere,48 one finds a similar simplification in 
the way that current Fourth Amendment law treats the home as opposed to 
public space.  The home receives extraordinary protection.  Police need a 
warrant based on probable cause to enter and observe—and this is true even 
when the in-home activity they observe is not particularly private.  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Kyllo, an officer needs to meet this high standard 
even when he “barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the 
nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor.”49  By contrast, police are free to 
observe intimate behavior when it takes place in a public setting.  Police 
might watch, for example, as somebody enters a psychologist’s or 
psychiatrist’s office, presumably to inquire about setting up or attending a 
medical appointment.50 
So, perhaps, the same kind of approach makes sense in the context of 
public records.  After all, we certainly have some powerful intuitions that 
certain records are more private than others.  As the Standards Commentary 
notes, for example, most people would agree that health records are more 
sensitive and merit more protection than utility records.51  Moreover, just as 
public forum doctrine deals with competing public interests—in robust 
speech, on the one hand, and in other uses of public space, on the other—a 
four-level classification of records’ privacy might be seen as dividing the 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). 
 48. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance 
Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 41-43 (2013). 
 49. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). 
 50. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: 
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1349, 1357-58 (2004) (noting that “[a] person usually cannot enter a psychiatrist's office, 
marriage counseling center, or infertility clinic except from a public street”). 
 51. STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary.  
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realm of information into different “territories,” in some of which 
individuals’ interest in free and unmonitored exploration is paramount, and 
in others where law enforcement interests in vigorously finding, and 
following, leads is given more weight.   
Moreover, while this article later raises some concerns about the 
Standards’ proposed factors for assigning categories to each type of 
records,52 certain elements of the proposed factors would move records 
laws in the right direction.  More specifically, some of these factors help 
assure that this division of records into “territories” with different levels of 
privacy is not simply an arbitrary one.  For example, the Standards are 
certainly right that privacy becomes more critical when it provides crucial 
support for an individual’s ability to engage in “freedom of speech and 
association.”53  Where the integrity of certain records is essential to free and 
spontaneous discussion or intellectual exploration, then there is a case to be 
made that these are records where protection of privacy becomes more 
crucial.  This is an argument I have made in an earlier work on the privacy 
of library or Internet activity.54  
It has also received significant discussion in the work of Professor Julie 
Cohen and Professor Neil Richards.  As Cohen writes, “[C]ompelled 
disclosure of information about intellectual consumption threaten[s] rights 
of personal integrity and self-definition in subtle but powerful ways . . . 
[because] fine-grained observation subtly shapes behavior, expression, and 
ultimately identity.”55 Richards writes,  
[W]hen the government is listening to our phone calls or 
businesses are tracking and analyzing what we read, these 
activities menace our processes of cognition and our freedoms of 
thought and speech. If we are interested in a free and robust 
public debate we must safeguard its wellspring of private 
intellectual activity.56  
In the twentieth century, such intellectual privacy was largely achieved 
in a manner akin to public forum doctrine: by giving individuals an 
institutional space—namely, the public library—where strong privacy 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See infra Part III.  
 53. STANDARD 25-4.1(a). 
 54. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in 
Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied 
Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799 (2006). 
 55. Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 577 (2003). 
 56. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 391 (2008). 
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norms allowed them to access all manner of reading materials free from 
external observation.57  As BJ Ard writes, the rise of the Internet and digital 
reading have undermined this institutional actor-based privacy regime.58  
Intellectual privacy in the modern age, he argues, thus requires privacy 
protection that applies not just to particular actors (like libraries) but to 
reading records with particular content.59  In other words, intellectual 
privacy now requires the type of third party protection that the Standards 
advocate.  In fact, the emphasis that the Standards’ first factor places on 
free speech and association in some respects carves up the world of private 
information enclaves in a way that is parallel—in both form and purpose—
to the way that public forum doctrine carves up shared public spaces.  
Public forums such as parks and streets are set aside for robust debate and 
communication of private ideas.  They are places where certain other public 
interests (such as interests in noise and pollution control) must therefore 
take a “back seat” to speech interests.  In the law of records protection, 
certain channels of informational activity are likewise crucial for another 
part of the speech process—namely the private reflection upon, and forging 
of, new ideas—and so these too are realms where certain interests, such as 
the interest in crime investigations, must be limited enough to leave space 
for intellectual freedom.  
The other factors offered by the Standards likewise provide sensible 
guidelines for marking off certain informational realms as zones of 
heightened privacy.  Health records, for example, are not by and large 
records of our intellectual activity: a record indicating that a medical visit 
revealed a heart condition, for example, does not divulge confidential 
thoughts or communications.  But there are other reasons for treating such 
records as “highly private” because while their release might not chill 
intellectual exploration or private conversation, it might well do another 
kind of harm.  In the words of the factors used by the Standards, it might 
cause “embarrassment” or “stigma” if released to others in the person’s 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Blitz, supra note 54, at 805-07.  The protection that the First Amendment 
provides for the privacy of one’s home has also provided space for intellectual freedom.  As 
the Supreme Court wrote in Stanley v. Georgia, under the First Amendment the “State has 
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what 
films he may watch.”  394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 58. BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader 
Privacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 30-45 (2013). 
 59. Id. at 46. 
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community—and may also have other negative consequences (such as loss 
of a job).60 
To be sure, legislators who simplify the world by artificially dividing it 
into three or four categories should take careful account of what they 
sacrifice in doing so.  In the case of personal records, one might well find 
numerous counterexamples to any classification that a legislature proposes.  
As the Standards note, the “content of communications” in phone 
conversations and e-mails is almost certainly a paradigmatic example of 
“highly private” information.61  But anyone can probably remember 
numerous phone conversations and e-mail exchanges that lacked any 
sensitive details—whether it is small talk with a relative or colleague 
revealing nothing of interest about a person’s life, or a call to a coffee shop 
or Department Store to confirm the hours it will open.  One can likewise 
identify certain minimally private records within the generally private realm 
of personal health information.  People are generally less guarded about a 
thumb injury than about a serious illness.  Moreover, not only do certain 
communications and health records present counterexamples, but certain 
individuals do as well.  While some people may be horrified at the thought 
of alerting strangers to a cancer diagnosis, others may blog about it on a 
public website.62   
None of these examples, however, seriously undermines the Standards’ 
classification scheme.  In the first place, there is no plausible way for a 
legal protection scheme to capture every nuance in individuals’ 
expectations about privacy protection.  Moreover, this kind of 
simplification is often necessary to give people some control over what they 
choose to keep private.  People are free, for example, to fill their protected 
communication space with non-private conversation, and often do.  But 
high levels of protection at least preserve their option to use it for 
confidential communications.  In this respect, the records classification 
scheme resembles First Amendment public forum jurisprudence.  Public 
forum doctrine allows individuals to use parks or streets for numerous 
activities far more mundane than political debates or religious proselytizing 
(such as organizing and playing a game of Frisbee) but always leaves them 
with the possibility of having some space from which they can preach to the 
                                                                                                                 
 60. STANDARD 25-4.1(b). 
 61. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary. 
 62. See Eliza Barclay, Why More Patients Should Blog About Illness and Death, NPR 
(Mar. 28. 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/03/26/175383540/why-more-
patients-should-blog-about-illness-and-death (noting that “while many illness blogs are read 
only by friends and family, some patients go more public with their stories”). 
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world about their political or religious beliefs or about other topics on 
which they wish to communicate with the public.63 
If the Standards have a problem, then, it is not that they divide up the 
realm of our personal information in a way that entails some simplification, 
but rather in how such a necessary simplification is carried out and what 
happens after such a division of our informational space is made, when 
specific protection mechanisms are put in place for each tier.  I will 
elaborate upon each of these issues in turn. 
II. Rethinking the Factors for Setting Privacy Levels 
As teachers at all levels realize, it is often less challenging to come up 
with a general grading system (e.g., assigning students an “A”,“B”, “C”, 
“D”, or “F”) than it is to figure out which essay deserves which grade.  The 
same is true here.  While some may push for more complexity and nuance 
in records’ classification, and perhaps for giving courts a freer hand to 
assign records a particular privacy “value,” the Standards can and do make 
a strong case for a tier-based system of records classification that runs from 
“not private” at the bottom of the list to “highly private” at the top.  As the 
Standards Commentary recognizes, however, “while people typically agree 
on the extremes . . . there are few bright lines in privacy, and there will be 
reasoned disagreement in many cases.”64 
To help lawmakers and others tackle this disagreement—and perhaps, 
their own uncertainty—in an orderly fashion, the Standards propose the 
factors discussed above, drawing heavily upon the past privacy law cases, 
legislative judgments, and scholarly contributions.  It is helpful, at this 
juncture, to state them fully in the Standards’ own language.  Under 
Standard 4.1, when deciding whether  
information maintained by third parties . . . [is] highly private, 
moderately private, minimally private, or not private, a 
legislature, court, or administrative agency should consider 
present and developing technology and the extent to which: 
 (a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional 
third party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2989 n.17 (2010) (finding law school’s nondiscrimination policy 
for student organizations, including both religious and Frisbee clubs, followed applicable 
limited public forum precedents). 
 64. STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary.  
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society or in commerce, or is socially beneficial, including to 
freedom of speech and association; 
 (b) such information is personal, including the extent to which 
it is intimate and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if 
disclosed, and whether outside of the initial transfer to an 
institutional third party it is typically disclosed only within one’s 
close social network, if at all; 
 (c) such information is accessible to and accessed by non-
government persons outside the institutional third party; and 
 (d) existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts or 
allows access to and dissemination of such information or of 
comparable information.65  
These factors capture a number of important insights and intuitions about 
the values that underlie protection of third party information.  But like 
many other factor-based tests, they risk leaving lawmakers, courts, and 
agencies with too little guidance to generate administrable and consistent 
legal frameworks.  Different lawmakers may well give different weight to 
different factors.  Indeed, the first two factors above seem to add to this 
complexity and unpredictability because each of them is more accurately 
understood as a package of factors than a discrete and focused concern.  
Factor (a) asks lawmakers to determine (1) whether the information at issue 
is the kind that individuals are compelled to share in order to participate in 
modern life, (2) whether, even if individuals are free to avoid such sharing, 
its dissemination would undermine some social benefit, and (3) whether 
such benefits are not merely social benefits, but the safeguarding of First 
Amendment freedoms that, unlike other social benefits, the Constitution 
places beyond democratic majorities’ capacity to trade for other benefits.66  
For some transfers of information, such as telephone conversations, the 
answer to all three of these questions might be “yes.”67  But it is also true 
that, of the activities required for meaningful participation in life, some are 
more beneficial than others, and not all of them might play a significant role 
in speech or other First Amendment activity.   
                                                                                                                 
 65. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) to -4.1(d). 
 66. STANDARD 25-4.1(a). 
 67. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary (noting that telephone conversations, as well as e-
mail and other electronic communications, further “the freedoms of expression and 
association” and are “necessary to participate meaningfully in society and in commerce”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/4
2014]        THIRD PARTY RECORDS PROTECTION 763 
 
 
Factor (b) likewise asks both (1) whether the information is intimate 
information of a sort that will cause emotional shame if released, or (2) 
whether it should be considered “personal” simply because individuals’ 
existing practice tends to show that people tend to treat it as such, and avoid 
sharing it, whether because they fear its release will cause shame and 
stigma, or for some completely different reason.68  
The upshot of these factors’ complexity is that the order and 
predictability that the Standards promise with one hand, they at least begin 
to retract with the other: They offer an overarching four-tier system for 
classifying records’ privacy level but then make the tier designation for 
each record depend on a highly contextual factor-based analysis, the result 
of which is likely to vary depending on who is applying it.  While no legal 
framework can avoid some unpredictability in its application, one of the 
major reasons that certain judges prefer systems of legal categories rather 
than fine-grained contextual judgments is that such systems are more likely 
to resist reasoning that is arbitrary, idiosyncratic, or result-oriented.  
Consider again First Amendment public forum doctrine: One of the reasons 
the Court has adhered to it despite calls for nuance is to keep constitutional 
rules from being too easily bent or redefined to accommodate discomfort 
with their implications.  As Justice Kennedy said in a 1996 case, a more 
rule-like approach to the law forces justices to adhere to a rule provided “in 
advance” regarding a law’s constitutional validity “rather than letting the 
height of the bar be determined by the apparent exigencies of the day.”69 
Such a system also provides “notice and fair warning to those who must 
predict how the courts will respond to attempts to suppress their speech.”70 
As Justice Souter agreed in the same case, “Reviewing speech regulations 
under fairly strict categorical rules keeps the starch in the standards for 
those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may 
be said.”71  This doesn’t mean that such strict categorical rules are always 
optimal.  Perhaps they are less essential in legislation, which can always be 
amended, than in constitutional precedent, which legislators cannot override 
and judges are hesitant to overrule. 
But if there is a way to help guarantee that the Standards’ four-tier 
system can provide the order and predictability it promises, then it is worth 
                                                                                                                 
 68. STANDARD 25-4.1(b). 
 69. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 774 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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seeking.  Here then is one attempt at simplifying the factors and at leaving 
them less of a Rorschach test than they otherwise might be. 
The factors seem to be principally focused on counseling legislators to 
undertake two major efforts.  One is to analyze and understand the gravity 
of the harms that flow from certain privacy violations.  While the Standards 
do not provide a definitive assessment of which harms are the gravest, they 
give most sustained attention to the harms that threaten constitutional 
interests, such as free speech or the autonomy at the core of substantive due 
process.  As factor (a) notes, government surveillance—and the risk of 
subsequent dissemination—of certain private communications may well 
discourage individuals from participating in modern society and commerce, 
and may even undercut the intellectual exploration, debate, and association 
that the First Amendment is meant to safeguard.72  And as factor (b) notes, 
where information concerns intimate activity or is otherwise personal, its 
release can cause “embarrassment or stigma.”73  Standard 25-3.3 gives 
further emphasis to this concern, noting that the release of a recording can 
“chill freedoms of speech, association, and commerce; and deter individuals 
from seeking medical, emotional, physical or other assistance for 
themselves or others.”74   
Rather than simply counseling legislators to reflect generally upon the 
social costs (or foregone benefits) that may flow from a lessening of 
privacy and to weigh them as they see fit, a slightly amended framework 
might provide more guidance.  It might ask that lawmakers adopt a 
presumption that, where the activity reflected in the information involves a 
sphere of activity protected by First Amendment or due process protections, 
such records should be classified as “highly private” or “moderately 
private,” and that such a presumption should be set aside only when there 
are certain powerful reasons that cut the other way.  A presumption in favor 
of privacy might be overridden, for example, by strong traditions or norms 
that treat such information as “non” or “minimally private,” or concrete 
evidence that such a classification—and the burdens it imposes on police—
would have grievous effects on their ability to fight crime.   
Apart from concerns about privacy harms, the Standards’ factor-based 
analysis also dwells (in at least three of the four factors) on a second 
concern: that legislators should strive to align their classifications with 
individuals’ intuitions and society’s norms about when and where privacy is 
                                                                                                                 
 72. STANDARD 25-4.1(a). 
 73. STANDARD 25-4.1(b). 
 74. STANDARD 25-3.3. 
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most necessary.  As the Standards Commentary emphasizes, a drafter of 
new records law is “not writing on a clean slate.”75  Rather, there are 
already social expectations, norms, and rules about privacy, and it makes 
sense to craft legal privacy protections that reflect these background 
understandings and previous privacy rules.  This imperative is already built 
into the “Katz” test that courts use to determine what constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment—wherein they classify as a search (and thus, 
subject to constitutional limits) any governmental investigatory technique 
that intrudes upon an “expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.”76  Legislators should consider, says factor (b), 
whether people seem to treat information as “personal” in that they 
“typically disclos[e] [it] only within [their] close social network[s].”77  They 
should also consider, under factor (c), whether information about a person 
is the kind that people already understand is frequently available to others.78  
And they should understand, as factor (d) makes clear, that evidence of 
existing privacy expectations is found not only in social norms and 
practices, but also in existing law, such as the law of privilege.79  The 
Standards Commentary also points lawmakers to other evidence about 
intuitions, norms, and practices, such as the survey responses that 
Christopher Slobogin and Joel Schumacher obtained from Americans 
regarding how they would rank the intrusiveness of different kinds of 
government investigatory techniques.80  
Of course, apart from examining existing norms, social practices, and 
laws, lawmakers also have to decide what to do with such an analysis: in 
many cases, the evidence is likely to be inconclusive.  Different evidence 
will point in different directions.  And in the case of new computer 
technologies, individuals may not yet have developed strong intuitions or 
social norms about its privacy.  
One possibility is for lawmakers to adopt a default position that, in the 
absence of a clear answer, tilts the scales towards a higher or lower privacy 
level.  There is at least one strong reason to tilt the scales in favor of lower 
                                                                                                                 
 75. STANDARD 25-4.1(d) commentary. 
 76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 77. STANDARD 25-4.1(b). 
 78. STANDARD 25-4.1(c). 
 79. STANDARD 25-4.1(d). 
 80. STANDARD 25-4.1(b) commentary (citing Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. 
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment 
Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society”, 42 
DUKE L.J. 727 (1993)). 
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privacy protection: a presumption the other way might leave law 
enforcement with little room for investigating third party information.  This 
result seems plausible given that, in the discussion of the factors focused 
largely on possible harms (factors (a) and (b)), the Standards tentatively 
find that most of their examples are likely to count as highly or moderately 
private, at least insofar as that particular factor is concerned.81  The content 
of individuals’ phone and Internet communications is, of course, central to 
speech and central to meaningful participation in modern society.  So, 
applying the first factor, the Standards find such content to be “more 
private.”82  They reach the same conclusion for “information relating to 
communication[],” “medical records,” “utility consumption,” “[f]inancial 
[a]ccount and [t]ransaction [r]ecords,” IP address information and URLs, 
and (more tentatively), “Geographic Vicinity” records.83 
The results are more mixed when the Standards’ discussion moves to the 
second factor and looks at whether particular categories of records are 
“personal.”  They emphasize that “some information is more personal than 
other information.”84  And among their examples, utility records and IP 
address information appear to drop to the lower privacy tiers.85  But here as 
well, most of their examples (e.g., communications content and metadata, 
financial transaction records, URL address information, and geographic 
vicinity information) can plausibly be categorized as personal and often 
seem to be regarded as such by survey respondents and others.86  Some of 
these categories of records would likely be excluded from the highest rungs 
of the privacy classification under my own revised proposal.  That proposal 
accords a presumption of high privacy only to information, the release of 
which would threaten autonomy interests related to free speech, intellectual 
exploration, medical treatment, intimate activity, or some other activity in 
the zones that our constitutional systems mark off as a realm of individual 
autonomy, therefore insulated against government control.  Financial 
records may receive some privacy protection, for example, but it is less 
likely that their release would compromise core speech interests. 
In any event, if a consideration of privacy harms tends to err on the side 
of placing third party records off-limits to police investigation—until they 
obtain a court order based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion—it 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary; STANDARD 25-4.1(b) commentary.  
 82. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary. 
 83. Id. 
 84. STANDARD 25-4.1(b) commentary. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/4
2014]        THIRD PARTY RECORDS PROTECTION 767 
 
 
may not make sense for inconclusive analyses of social norms and intuition 
to err in the same direction.  As the Standards note, “[R]ecords searches . . . 
are surely one of the most important investigatory activities, and have been 
for many years.”87  Phone and Internet records, bank records, and purchase 
records can often be essential to giving police a lead to find criminals who 
would otherwise evade justice, and “records access has the additional 
benefit of not risking a physical confrontation with the target.”88  Moreover, 
police need to have some place to begin an investigation.89  In order to 
satisfy the probable cause or reasonable suspicion standard, there needs to 
be some information they can collect for that purpose beforehand.  
Perhaps, then, where the privacy of third party information is not central 
to our exercise of speech or other First Amendment rights, and not central 
to the personal autonomy we exercise over our bodies and in our bedrooms, 
lawmakers should not rush to assume classify it has “highly private” where 
social norms and practice point only ambiguously or weakly in that 
direction.  
To be sure, there are countervailing considerations.  As Justice Brandeis 
wrote in Olmstead many years ago, even when an investigation is “in aid of 
law enforcement. . . . [our] experience should teach us to be most on our 
guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent.”90  
Such a consideration may favor erring on the side of keeping records 
private—and perhaps on the side of assuming that information should retain 
a higher level of privacy unless and until powerful evidence is produced 
showing that it should be “minimally private” or “not private.”  But given 
police’s long-standing reliance on records investigations, and the 
importance such investigations have for law enforcement’s success, 
legislators should be hesitant to apply—to all types of records—a 
presumption of high privacy.  After all, when Brandeis wrote the above-
quoted language, he was not focused on all methods of police investigation, 
but rather about wiretapping, searches of “secret papers,” and other 
invasions of what he considered core Fourth Amendment liberties.91   
A system that disables police—across all types and methods of 
surveillance—even when such core interests are not at stake, is unlikely to 
                                                                                                                 
 87. STANDARD 25-3.2 commentary. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance 
Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 Am. U. L. REV. 21, 37 (2013). 
 90. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 91. Id. 
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strike a “delicate” and correct balance between law enforcement interests 
and privacy.92   
To summarize: I propose that the factor analysis might be simplified and 
that legislators should at least begin by considering (1) privacy harms and 
(2) existing social practices and laws.  As they do so, they may adopt a 
presumption in favor of treating records related to core First Amendment or 
autonomy interests as “highly private” and another presumption that other 
records will be minimally private (and thus, accessible without a court 
order) unless there is strong evidence that individuals regard and treat 
information as moderately or highly private. 
This proposal is certain to draw some objections—one of which is that it 
overlooks certain important elements of the Standards’ proposed factors 
and too quickly subsumes others into the broad categories of “privacy 
harms” or “law, social norms, practices revealing privacy level,” when 
there are good reasons to consider them independently.   
Consider one aspect of the factors I did not discuss above: Apart from 
asking whether a records investigation would cause certain types of harms 
(e.g., constitutionally significant autonomy interests), the Standards’ first 
factor also appears to have another important purpose.  It aims to right one 
of the wrongs that scholarly commentators—and Supreme Court 
dissenters—have long found in the Court’s doctrine.  As explained earlier,93 
under this doctrine an individual has no constitutionally protected privacy 
interest against police investigation of information that she knowingly 
shared with third parties.  More specifically, the Standards’ first factor 
discourages lawmakers from adopting the mistaken assumption—often 
found in the third party cases94—that individuals can protect their privacy 
by simply keeping the information to themselves.  As Stephen Henderson 
notes, when the Supreme Court insisted that depositors knowingly share 
information with their banks, the Court failed to take into account that “the 
                                                                                                                 
 92. To be sure, computer technology may, in the future, provide us with an alternative 
way of marking the boundary between highly protected information (available only with 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion) and information that police can access more quickly 
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legislators might instead require those who keep digital records to distinguish between the 
more and less sensitive component of each record.  It is possible, for example, for many 
categories of records police will be able to satisfy probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
with de-identified data, and thus be permitted to connect it to particular individuals only 
after satisfying such a threshold.  The Standards include a discussion of such a system.  See 
STANDARD 25-5.6. 
 93. See supra notes 16-17 an accompanying text.  
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‘choice’ to convey information to a bank is not voluntary in any meaningful 
sense.”95  Indeed, individuals are required to constantly share information 
about their activities, including very sensitive information, if they want to 
participate in modern society.  This was true in the 1970s, when an 
individual could not call another person unless they made contact through, 
and shared the number they were calling with, a telephone company’s 
central office.  It is even more true in an age where individuals cannot use a 
computer without conveying incredibly sensitive information to Internet 
service providers and cannot carry a cell phone without exposing their 
physical movements, and phone and Internet activities, to outside 
observation.96  The first factor makes clear that the price of life in modern 
society should not be a complete sacrifice of privacy.  It urges lawmakers to 
consider whether “the initial transfer of such information to an institutional 
third party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society or 
in commerce.”97   
This is certainly an important point, but it is not one that always has 
importance in determining a record’s privacy.  Some of the information we 
use to function in modern life is quite private.  This is true, for example, of 
the e-mail content and web surfing choices that we share with Internet 
service providers.98  The limited (and unavoidable) sharing that makes such 
e-mail and web surfing possible should not, as the Standards rightly point 
out, make it any less private. 
However, this is not true of all information we are forced to share as we 
move through modern society.  We often have no choice but to share 
information about our home address in order to own that property and 
receive mail and other services there.  This does not mean our home address 
is moderately or highly private, and should consequently be unavailable to 
law enforcement in the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  
Thus, the fact that we must share information as a condition of life in 
modern society shouldn’t weigh against a finding of high privacy, but 
neither should it weigh in favor of it.  Rather, it is most important as a 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-
Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 987 (2007) 
(citing Burrows v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino Cnty., 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974)). 
 96. Bob Sullivan, Byte Me: How Our Gadgets Track Our Every Move, NBCNEWS.COM 
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/byte-me-how-our-gadgets-track-our-
every-move-n18621. 
 97. STANDARD 25-4.1(a). 
 98. See Lincoln Spector, Is Your ISP Spying on You?, PCWORLD (Sept. 3, 2012), http:// 
www.pcworld.com/article/261752/is_your_isp_spying_on_you_.html.  
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corrective—in those circumstances where lawmakers might otherwise 
wrongly assume that by knowingly sharing our information with a third 
party (or perhaps sharing it widely with numerous third parties), we have 
sacrificed our private interests in it.  The Standards rightly point out that 
this assumption is a flawed one where our sharing is not truly voluntary, but 
rather something that everyone must do simply to live a normal life.99  
However, putting emphasis on such a corrective only makes sense in the 
situation it is intended to correct.  Thus, legislators should avoid beginning 
every factor-based analysis of the privacy levels by considering whether 
information is of the kind we need to share in order “to participate 
meaningfully in society or in commerce.”100  It makes more sense to raise 
this point only when it is needed.  For example, if existing privacy laws and 
social practices seem to indicate that a certain kind of information is widely 
shared, legislators might then ask the follow-up question of whether such 
information is shared because individuals consider it non-sensitive, or 
rather because individuals are compelled to share it whether it is sensitive 
or not.   
Defenders of the Standards’ current set of factors might also object to 
simply treating privilege law (factor (d)) or evidence of sharing with 
numerous “non-governmental entities” (factor (c)) as nothing more than 
components of a more general analysis about whether information is 
currently treated as private.  Where information is so sensitive as to be 
subject to a legal privilege, one might argue, this should trump evidence of 
social practices that points the other way.  For example, even if people 
often tell friends, family, and acquaintances about what their lawyers said 
to them, perhaps the information should still be treated as highly private 
when there is a strong attorney-client privilege available in the law for those 
who choose not to waive it.  Likewise, as the Standards note, where 
information that is “personal” and otherwise regarded as private is widely 
disseminated to numerous third parties, lawmakers may legitimately ask 
why not also allow it to be shared with the police.101  To be sure, it may 
make sense to try to structure the way legislators apply each factor by 
formulating sub-factors that can guide the application of that factor.  They 
could, for example, make a list of the types of evidence they will normally 
apply to uncover evidence of whether (and to what extent) modern social 
practices, legal rules, and expectations treat certain types of information as 
                                                                                                                 
 99. STANDARD 25-4.1(a). 
 100. STANDARD 25-4.1(a). 
 101. STANDARD 25-4.1(b).  
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private.  But that doesn’t mean that the law of privilege, or evidence of 
dissemination to third parties, is so critical to this inquiry that it should have 
a separate status.  The law of privilege, for example, is intended to protect 
sensitive information not against police observation, but against discovery 
and possible use at trial by litigation opponents.102 
III. An Alternative to Traditional Protection Categories:  Another Way to 
Frame Law Enforcement Interests 
Whereas the Standards provide lawmakers, courts, and agencies with 
detailed advice on how to classify a particular record’s level of privacy (as 
high, moderate, minimal, or non-private), they provide far less explanation 
as to why they match each such level with a particular type of protection 
(demands for probable cause, reasonable suspicion, relevance, or no 
protection).   
This is not surprising.  Lawmakers and other legal actors may be 
unfamiliar with how to draw the line between “highly private” and 
“moderately private” information, for example, because this is not a line 
that is familiar in legislation or case law.  By contrast, the Standards’ 
categories of protection are familiar ones.  The Constitution itself demands 
that government show probable cause to obtain the warrants required under 
the Fourth Amendment,103 and courts have struggled for years to define 
what probable cause means and demands.104  Since it decided Terry v. Ohio 
in 1968, the Court has demanded “reasonable suspicion” in cases (such as 
“stop-and-frisk” investigations or “special needs” cases) where they wish to 
give police more leeway to investigate certain subjects, but still want them 
to remain subject to external constitutional restraint.105 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000).  
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The requirement of 
probable cause has roots that are deep in our history.” (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 
U.S. 98, 100 (1959))); United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S 160, 175 (1949) (stating that 
probable cause requires “less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction” but “more 
than bare suspicion”); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924) (defining probable 
cause as “reasonable ground for belief of guilt” (citing McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 
(1881))); United States v. Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (“It imports a seizure 
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.”). 
 105. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding that to make an investigatory stop, an officer does not 
need probable cause and may instead make such a stop when he “observes unusual conduct 
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may 
be afoot”). 
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Christopher Slobogin provides a fuller account of these standards in the 
“four-tier” system of protection that he presents in his book, Privacy at 
Risk—a system that advocates use of categories of protection quite similar 
to those that the Standards set forth for records.106  As Slobogin observes, 
“The probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards are well 
established and fairly well defined,” with probable cause often being 
equated with “a more-likely-than-not (51 percent) finding, or perhaps a 
level of certainty somewhat below that” and reasonable suspicion 
“associated with approximately a 30 percent level of certainty.”107  
Relevance, by contrast is “commonly associated with subpoenas” rather 
than court orders, and, as Slobogin explains, generally is used to describe 
evidence that has “any tendency to make a fact in issue more probable than 
not.”108  
These “categories of protection” allow legislators to use an “off the 
shelf” solution for records protection rather than trying to begin from 
scratch with a system that courts may then take years to refine and that 
government officials may struggle to understand. 
These categories also play a crucial role in the balance that the Standards 
aim to strike between law enforcement needs and individual privacy 
interests.  These categories of protection essentially measure the 
government-interest side of that balance.  The higher a record’s level of 
privacy, the stronger the government’s interest must be to obtain it.  This 
interest is measured by the government’s ability to meet probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion, or whatever level of certainty is required—and, for 
the two highest tiers of privacy, officials are also faced with the hurdle of 
convincing a court, and not just an internal agency official, that the requisite 
level of certainty is met.  
However, while legislators should certainly take advantage of these 
ready-made categories of protection, they should not be confined to them; 
there are circumstances in which the law enforcement interests at stake may 
not be fully captured by a “level of suspicion” standard.  For example, there 
may well be circumstances where the government’s interest in seeing a 
record is not the kind of interest that will meet probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion.  Rather, in certain circumstances law enforcement may need to 
be free from such a burden.  It may need to examine “highly” or 
                                                                                                                 
 106. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 38.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 39. 
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“moderately” private records even when it cannot satisfy the probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion standard. 
This kind of circumstance is already a familiar one in Fourth 
Amendment law’s special needs cases.  “Special needs” searches are those 
that occur in a setting where “special needs, beyond the normal need for 
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”109  In fact, in the special needs context, the Court not only 
allows officials to conduct a search without a warrant or probable cause—it 
also allows them to conduct a search without any individualized suspicion 
of any kind.  It allows random drug tests at schools and workplaces,110 
sobriety checks of all drivers at a fixed highway checkpoints,111 and 
searches of travelers and their belongings at airports.112  As the Court has 
noted, such “even-handed blanket” searches are permissible in special 
needs searches conducted “outside the criminal context” so long as they are 
justified by a “balancing [of] the invasion of privacy [entailed by the 
search] against the government’s strong need.”113  
As this statement indicates, the “government’s strong need” in this case 
is one that is not measured by its ability to satisfy probable cause (or some 
lower threshold of individualized suspicion).  Rather, it is an interest that 
justifies waiving of the normal probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
requirement.  
In some cases, the Court tolerates blanket searches because the State, 
when conducting them, has stepped out of its role as general enforcer of the 
laws and into a more limited role in which it is not authorized to jail people 
or otherwise subject them to criminal penalties.  Where such general 
searches are available to authorities in public schools or workplaces, they 
are not tools to ferret out and punish crime, but rather tools the State can 
use only in its special role of ensuring school or workplace safety and 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).  
 110. Id. (schools); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S 602, 619-21 (1989)  
(workplaces).   
 111. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 112. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a search 
of a traveler at an airport was a reasonable search and noting that administrative searches of 
this kind have been upheld on the ground that they serve a “special governmental need, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement”(quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)). 
 113. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Andresen v. 
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (noting that the Fourth Amendment forbids “general, 
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings”). 
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discipline.114  In this respect, Fourth Amendment law mirrors First 
Amendment law, which allows school principals and government 
employers to impose speech limits on students115 and workers116 that would 
run afoul of free speech protection if they were imposed by Congress or 
state legislatures on citizens more generally.  School and workplace 
officials may likewise conduct searches of a kind that would violate the 
Fourth Amendment if the state tried to conduct them in other contexts.117   
But some permissible blanket searches are less clearly outside the 
criminal context.  For example, if we are stopped at a sobriety checkpoint, 
the search we must undergo is conducted by a uniformed police officer, not 
a schoolteacher or workplace supervisor.  If such a search reveals to the 
officer that we are in fact drunk while driving on the highway, we not only 
face immediate limits on our driving privileges, but also potential criminal 
charges.  The same is true at an airport security checkpoint.  If a search of 
our bag turns up evidence of a weapon, such a discovery might well result 
in an arrest and indictment, not simply a refusal to let us board an airplane.   
In these cases, the government need that justifies release from the normal 
individualized suspicion requirement is not a need that takes place outside 
the law enforcement context (to a school or workplace) but rather a need, 
which although related to law enforcement, goes beyond “the general 
interest in crime control.”118  As the Court has noted, such an extraordinary 
law enforcement need may emerge when police set up roadblocks to 
“thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is 
likely to flee by way of a particular route.”119  These examples would likely 
count as the kind of emergency or exigent circumstance in which, the 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (“It is clear that the Customs Service’s drug 
testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement.  Test results 
may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee's 
consent.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988) 
(permitting a principal’s censorship of a school newspaper). 
 116. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-49 (1983) (permitting an employer 
to fire an employee who challenged a transfer and submitted a questionnaire to colleagues 
about the transfer policy).  
 117. E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985). 
 118. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (noting that law 
enforcement may search cars without reasonable suspicion only where their purpose is more 
particular than “the general interest in crime control”); see also Blitz, supra note 50, at 1451-
52 (noting that suspicionless searches at airports are used not only to prevent terrorism, but 
to apprehend and punish those attempting it).  
 119. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (forbidding police from using a roadblock program to 
search for evidence of drug use). 
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Standards make clear, police may obtain even a highly private record 
pursuant only to “the request of a law enforcement officer or prosecutor,”120 
without the need to first obtain authorization from a neutral magistrate. But 
not all such extraordinary law enforcement needs fit easily into the category 
of emergency or exigency.  Routine airport searches, for example, are not 
performed only in the face of an expected hijacking.  They take place every 
day, even in the absence of any terror alerts.  Nonetheless, the cost of police 
missing such an air travel threat is so high that courts have treated this as an 
extraordinary security interest that justifies metal detectors and airport 
searches even absent individualized suspicion.121 
The Standards also carve out room for such a nonemergency exception to 
probable cause or other individualized suspicion requirements.  Standard 
25-4.2(b) waives them in circumstances where these requirements “would 
render law enforcement unable to solve or prevent an unacceptable amount 
of otherwise solvable or preventable crime, such that the benefits of 
respecting privacy are outweighed by this social cost.”122  A modern-day 
Justice Brandeis might well worry that this is precisely the kind of 
exception that law enforcement would eagerly broaden to clear away any 
privacy protecting hurdles in their way.  Where court order requirements 
come to seem frustrating, officials might insist to legislators that they 
impose high “social cost” and ask for them to be removed.  But a more 
generous reading of this requirement treats it as a parallel of sorts to the 
Fourth Amendment special needs requirement.  Like the special needs 
cases, it is intended not to sweep away probable cause or other 
individualized suspicion requirements, but rather to recognize—and permit 
a response to—the reality that the probable cause and individualized 
suspicion hurdles that provide invaluable privacy protection in most cases, 
might erect insuperable barriers to law enforcement activities in others. 
Still, the Standards’ cost-benefit escape clause is framed in worrisomely 
broad terms.  It is not only in airport searches or other terrorism-related 
cases that the police may argue that probable cause requirements constitute 
a hindrance with unacceptable “social costs,” but also in many situations 
where they are addressing the “general interest in crime control” that the 
Court has so far disqualified from special needs treatment.  To some extent, 
the special needs framework itself presents the same problem: in certain 
categories of searches, it allows police to escape the individualized 
                                                                                                                 
 120. STANDARD 25-5.4. 
 121. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 122. STANDARD 25-4.2(b). 
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suspicion requirement so long as they can argue that “the invasion of 
privacy [entailed by the search is outweighed by] the government’s strong 
need [for it].”123 
This Court’s embrace of such cost-benefit analysis in its special needs 
jurisprudence—and the ABA’s embrace of it in Standard 25-4.2(b)—
presents a striking contrast to the treatment that the same type of cost-
benefit analysis has received in First Amendment cases.  In United States v. 
Stevens, for example, the government met firm rejection from the Court 
when it argued that it should be freed from the normal First Amendment 
“strict scrutiny” requirements whenever lower protection was merited, 
given a “balancing of the value of the speech [in question] against its 
societal costs.”124  The Court responded that such a “free-floating test for 
First Amendment coverage” was “startling and dangerous” and reminded 
the government that the First Amendment speech protection “does not 
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of 
relative social costs and benefits,” but rather extends even to speech many 
consider to be of little value.125  To use the previously quoted language of 
Justice Souter, the First Amendment’s “strict categorical rules keep[] the 
starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries 
loudest for limiting what may be said.”126  By contrast, the outcome of a 
cost-benefit test would likely be strongly influenced by “daily politics.”  
To be sure, the Standards are providing a foundation not for 
constitutional rules, but for democratically enacted legislation, where it is 
typically more appropriate for decision makers to take account of, and 
respond to, what “daily politics cries . . . for.”127  Yet the Standards 
themselves seek to prevent this cost-benefit analysis from simply displacing 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion requirements.  They emphasize 
that even if societal costs outweigh privacy benefits and necessitate setting 
aside privacy protections, such a measure should preserve as much privacy 
as possible: privacy should be compromised only “to the limited extent 
necessary to correct this imbalance.”128  
                                                                                                                 
 123. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 673 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (stating that the 
Fourth Amendment forbids “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings”). 
 124. 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consort., Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785 
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 127. Id.  
 128. STANDARD 25-4.2(b). 
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There is, however, a better way of striking the right balance in situations 
where probable cause or other suspicion thresholds fail to take adequate 
account of law enforcement needs.  One finds such an alternative in the 
scrutiny-based system used in the First Amendment speech cases, the same 
scrutiny-based system that the justices have generally refused to replace 
with more “free form” cost-benefit analysis.129   
It is useful to explore how a framework modeled on the constitutional 
tiers of scrutiny might serve as an alternative to the balancing system that 
the Standards currently rely upon—not a full-fledged replacement for the 
Standards’ current model, but one that might be used in limited 
circumstances where individualized suspicion requirements are 
inappropriate. 
First, it is helpful to review how strict, intermediate, and minimal 
scrutiny work.  In general, each level of scrutiny imposes two types of 
requirements on government: an ends requirement and a means 
requirement.130  The ends requirement demands that the government 
objective be justified by an interest of a certain strength.  Where the 
government restriction threatens harm to core constitutional interests, for 
example, and thus triggers strict scrutiny, the government can justify its 
action only by showing that its interest is “compelling.”131  When 
intermediate scrutiny is the applicable standard, the government interest 
must only be “substantial” or “significant.”132  And where the government 
is subject to “minimal scrutiny,” any “legitimate government purpose” is 
sufficient.133  
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 785 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 130. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (2014). 
 131. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2717 (2013) (holding that laws 
subject to strict scrutiny must be “‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government 
interest” (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
720 (2007))).  
 132. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) 
(stating that to withstand intermediate scrutiny, the government must show that its restriction 
“‘directly advanc[es]’ a substantial governmental interest” and is “‘no more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest’” (quoting Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980))); Phelps-Roper v. Koster, 713 F.3d 942, 950 (8th Cir. 
2013) (stating that intermediate scrutiny requires, among other things, determining if the 
government’s “regulations are ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest’” 
(quoting Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, Mo., 697 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012))). 
 133. See Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that in 
order to survive rational basis review, or “minimal scrutiny,” a “challenged provision need 
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The means requirement goes further in that it demands that even where 
government has an interest of the appropriate strength, it still must (at least 
in the case of strict and intermediate scrutiny) take steps to minimize the 
harm it does to whatever liberty interests are involved.134   
Consider, for example, how intermediate scrutiny applies to so-called 
“time, place and manner” restrictions on when, where, and how people can 
gather for a rally, protest, or otherwise engage in public speech.  In these 
cases, the intermediate level of scrutiny is designed to strike a balance 
between the First Amendment interests of the protesters in free expressions 
and the government interests at stake when a protest or parade might disrupt 
traffic, or prevent others from using public space.135  Even though 
government in such cases, is often trying to protect safety interests and not 
trying to suppress a particular category of speech, it still must be regulating 
for (1) a sufficiently important reason, and not a minor interest that does not 
justify the First Amendment sacrifice it demands, and (2) in a way that 
attempts to minimize that First Amendment sacrifice rather than restricting 
far more speech than is necessary to fulfill the governments safety, traffic 
control, or other interests.136 
These elements of time, place, and manner regulation were all 
considered by the Court, for example, when it upheld the constitutionality 
of a Minnesota regulation that required organizations distributing or selling 
literature at the state fair to do so from an authorized “fixed location[]” at a 
rented booth.137  The International Society for Krishna Consciousness 
(ISKCON), whose members wished to distribute literature in various 
locations throughout the fair, challenged the regulation.138  The Court first 
                                                                                                                 
only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose” (citing TRM, Inc. v. United 
States, 52 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir. 1995))). 
 134. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (2014).  
 135. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (noting that 
constitutional protection of civil liberties is not inconsistent with government’s protection of 
“social need” such as “control of travel on the streets of cities”); Comite de Jornaleros de 
Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 947-48 (applying the time, place, 
and matter intermediate scrutiny test to strike down a solicitation that was not narrowly 
tailored to the “undisputed” government “duty and responsibility to keep their streets open 
and available for movement” (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-555 (1965))). 
 136. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that 
regulations are constitutional when they “are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, . . . are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”). 
 137. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 643 (1981). 
 138. Id. at 644. 
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assured itself that the state fair regulation was not aimed at suppressing the 
speech of ISKON members or any other speakers.  It noted, first, that the 
rule itself did not discriminate against any speakers, but rather “applie[d] 
evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute [literature] and sell written 
materials.”139  Moreover, said the Court, the rules were not only neutral on 
their face, but also prevented state officials from engaging in the kind of 
“covert” censorship that might result when “arbitrary discretion [to bar 
certain speakers but not others] is vested in some governmental 
authority.”140  Because “[t]he method of allocating space” was a 
“straightforward first come, first served system,” officials could not easily 
twist it into a tool for suppressing certain speakers, while allowing others to 
roam the fair.141  Had the Minnesota state fair rules flunked this test of 
genuine content-neutrality, they would have been subject not to 
intermediate scrutiny, but rather to the strict scrutiny that the Court applies 
to laws that bar speech on the basis of its content.142 
Even though the Court was convinced of the law’s neutrality, its speech 
limitation still entailed some threat to First Amendment interest—it limited 
the access that ISKON members had to potential audiences and that 
interested listeners had to ISKON’s speech.  So the government did not 
receive unlimited leeway to impose such restrictions.  It first needed to 
show that it was doing so in furtherance of a significant interest, justifying 
the First Amendment sacrifice the government was demanding (the ends 
requirement).143  The Supreme Court found its interest in crowd control at 
the state fair met this test.144  It also needed to show that it was not limiting 
speech much more severely than necessary to achieve this admittedly 
important interest, and that it left ample room for ISKON to engage in the 
speech in question (the means requirement).145  
We might better explain the logic of the Court’s analysis in the line of 
time, place, and manner cases with the help of a medical analogy.  When a 
surgeon is asked to perform a particularly risky operation to preserve a 
patient’s life or health, she might first seek to assure that whatever incisions 
she has to make near a vital area will not likely cause damage to an 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. at 649. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1992). 
 143. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649. 
 144. Id. at 650. 
 145. Id. at 650-51. 
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essential organ or physiological function.146  There is after all, little point in 
performing a brain operation to improve neurological function, if in doing 
so one causes more harm than improvement, for example, by destroying the 
hippocampal area necessary for individuals to form memories,147 or by 
destroying blood vessels necessary for a person to survive.  It is only where 
such a risk to life or mental integrity is the only hope for survival, or for 
avoiding some other catastrophic fate, that a doctor might, on such a cost-
benefit analysis, decide it is a risk worth taking.  By contrast, if the 
surgery—while not risk-free—raises concerns only about other less 
essential and central physiological functions, then surgeons whose goal is to 
safeguard a patient’s life and health may carry it out even when the 
situation is not as desperate.  Similarly, where a state’s attempt to protect 
citizens’ interest in safety or crime control measures is achieved only by 
causing harm to a critical constitutional interest—such as individuals 
freedom to hold and communicate the beliefs of their choice—then courts 
will allow a state to undertake action that jeopardizes those interests only 
where the harm it is addressing is so serious that the state can survive “strict 
scrutiny.”  
By contrast, where a state’s limit on speech is content-neutral, and thus 
does not oppress speech on the basis of its message or meaning, then the 
risk to First Amendment values is lower, and the state will have more 
leeway to impose the limit.  However, the risk to First Amendment interest 
still requires that it not do so lightly.  Rather, it must still show, under the 
Court’s “intermediate scrutiny” standard, that it is addressing a real and 
serious problem of the kind that justifies such a sacrifice (the ends 
requirement), and that it is doing so in a way that is calculated to avoid 
imposing unnecessary harm (the means requirement).148 
Where by contrast, a state’s actions do not threaten such a critical 
constitutional interest, the Court applies only minimal scrutiny and gives 
the government much freer reign.  It does not second-guess the 
government’s claim that its regulation is sufficiently important, demanding 
                                                                                                                 
   146.   See Blood Vessel Anomalies – Bleeding in the Brain, NEURO-SURGERY.EU, 
http://www.neuro-surgery.eu/EXEN/site/hs-hersenbloeding.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) 
(noting that certain brain malformations are “so large or difficult to access that surgery 
would be impossible without causing significant damage to normal tissue”). 
 147. See Jenni Ogden, HM: The Man with No Memory: A Neuropsychologist Muses on 
Brains, Books and Being Happy, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.psychology 
today.com/blog/trouble-in-mind/201201/hm-the-man-no-memory (describing how removal 
of a patient’s hippocampus to treat seizures left him with “dense memory loss”). 
 148. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
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only that the government end be a “legitimate” one (the ends 
requirement).149  And as long as the government’s measure is rationally 
related to this legitimate end, and not an arbitrary exercise of power, the 
Court will not second-guess the government’s methods (the means 
requirement).150  
It is tempting, perhaps, to treat the categories of protection already used 
by the Standards—probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and relevance—as 
respectively analogous to strict, intermediate, and minimal scrutiny.  But 
the analogy is actually a weak one.  First, probable cause as a general 
matter erects a far less significant hurdle against government action than 
does strict scrutiny.  As noted earlier, it demands that police have a level of 
certainty that exceeds (or perhaps nears) 50 percent probability that the 
evidence they are seeking be associated with a crime.151  This is a threshold 
police can often meet; they often succeed, after all, in obtaining a warrant 
from a neutral magistrate.  By contrast, strict scrutiny is, in most cases, 
almost impossible for the government to satisfy. 
Second, when applying the probable cause requirement, courts generally 
do not question the importance of the particular law enforcement interest 
that the government is pursuing.152  All the police need to do is show that 
they have the requisite level of confidence that the evidence they are 
seeking is linked to a crime, whatever its severity.153  To meet strict or 
intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, it is not sufficient for the 
government to convince a court that the problem it is addressing is a real 
                                                                                                                 
 149. See Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 150. Id. 
 151. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 38. 
 152. See Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: 
Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (2011) (“The 
various overarching verbal formulations that govern Fourth Amendment doctrine similarly 
ignore the wide variance in the public interest in solving different crimes. To detain (or 
arrest) a suspect, a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) that 
‘criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).  But 
see Andrew E. Taslitz, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs, 
Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2012, 
at 145, 153 (noting that a minority of courts consider probable cause to be a “variable 
standard” depending in part on “the crime’s severity”). 
   153.  See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 3.2(a) (5th ed. 2013) (noting that the Supreme Court refused “to adopt a 
proposed ‘multifactor balancing test’ for probable cause which ‘would require an officer to 
weigh . . . the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved and 
the circumstances attending the encounter’” (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
211 n.14 (1979))). 
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one—it must also convince the court that the problem is serious enough to 
justify the incursions into the liberty that result from (or are at least risked 
by) a speech restriction.154   
My proposal here is that, while the Standards’ categories of protection 
should continue to be the norm, legislators might apply a framework akin to 
scrutiny-based review where the government insists it has a need to be 
excused from probable cause requirement or whatever the normal category 
of protection would otherwise be.  
More specifically, law enforcement might be excused from such 
requirements only if it can satisfy (1) an ends requirement that demands, for 
example, that the law enforcement need is one that raises extraordinary 
concern and (2) a means requirement, demanding that even when law 
enforcement is excused from probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or 
relevance requirements, it must subject itself to other measures that help 
minimize privacy harms. 
As noted above, the ends requirement is at odds with the way the Court 
has generally decided Fourth Amendment cases.  Police need to show 
probable cause that the area to be searched or things to be seized are 
connected with a crime—not that the crime is a serious one.155  However, 
something akin to a serious crime requirement makes more sense when law 
enforcement is not attempting to satisfy probable cause (or reasonable 
suspicion), but rather seeking to justify being excused from such a 
requirement.  This, as already explained, is what is typically required in 
“special needs” cases, where law enforcement can only engage in 
suspicionless searches if they show they are addressing a “special need[], 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”156  Moreover, even after 
officials show that they are addressing a “special need,” they then have to 
show that the government interest justifying their search is strong enough to 
outweigh the privacy interests it compromises.  Emergencies and “exigent 
circumstances” might represent one set of circumstances that typically meet 
such an ends requirement.  But legislators, courts, and agencies might try to 
systematically identify others. Rather than simply treating the ends 
requirement as satisfied by any objective that a free form analysis leads 
lawmakers to believe outweighs the privacy interests on the other side of 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 
(1981).  
 155. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (finding that probable cause requires 
only “that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a 
crime” (emphasis added)). 
 156. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).   
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the balance, lawmakers might think more carefully about what specific 
types of government purposes would justify such an exception to the rules, 
as courts do when they ask what counts as an interest that is compelling or 
significant enough to respectively satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
The means requirement is also significant.  It allows legislators to place 
hurdles in government’s way that protect privacy even where it is not 
feasible to place hurdles of the kind one finds in probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion requirements.  More specifically, it might allow them 
to assure that, even when government demands some sacrifice to our 
privacy interests, it will cause as little harm as possible to those interests. 
One already finds this kind of “minimization” requirement in certain 
areas of Fourth Amendment law.  For example, as Susan Freiwald points 
out while addressing wiretapping and surreptitious video recording in a 
private environment, courts have often demanded even more from police in 
these searches than they do for “one-shot physical searches.”157  Rather, 
they have imposed a “heightened level of judicial oversight,” which 
demands that police not only have good reasons for using such electronic 
surveillance, but follow certain procedures when doing so158—procedures 
which, in the words of the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, are 
designed to “minimize[]” the “danger” by assuring that “no greater invasion 
of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances.”159  
Under Berger, this “minimization” requirement is one of the four 
requirements the government must meet to survive Fourth Amendment 
review of an eavesdropping request.160  And similar minimization demands 
have become a standard part of electronic surveillance law, and other 
features of surveillance law, such as the amended version of section 215 of 
the USA Patriot Act.161 
It has also found a place in the Court’s Fourth Amendment special needs 
cases.  The Court has emphasized the limited nature of the information 
collected and recorded by the government.  In Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, the Court noted that “chemical analysis of urine, like that 
                                                                                                                 
   157.   Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, ¶ 53. 
 158. Id. 
 159. 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967). 
 160. Id. at 56-57 (finding minimization to be part of the Fourth Amendment requirement 
that warrant requests be particularized). 
 161. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g) (2012) (requiring the 
Attorney General to “adopt specific minimization procedures governing the retention and 
dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of any tangible things, or information 
therein” in foreign intelligence or terrorism investigations governed by the act). 
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of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee.”162  
The Court then went on to observe that “under the [applicable] regulations,” 
the government was barred from using the urine and breath tests 
administered to railroad workers “as an occasion for inquiring into private 
facts unrelated to alcohol or drug use.”163  In National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, the Court likewise emphasized that “urine samples may 
be examined only for the specified drugs” and that “[t]he use of samples to 
test for any other substances is prohibited.”164  In Vernonia School District 
47J v. Acton, the Court made a similar point.165  The information collected 
by the drug testing system, it stressed, was hardly a treasure trove of 
personal information about a student’s medical condition or past 
behavior.166  “[I]t is significant that the tests at issue here look only for 
drugs, and not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, 
or diabetic.  Moreover, the drugs for which the samples are screened are 
standard, and do not vary according to the identity of the student.”167   
It has also emphasized the limits on who could access the drug testing 
information.  For example, in Board of Education of Independent School 
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, the Court emphasized that 
the drug testing procedures required that “test results be kept in confidential 
files separate from a student’s other educational records and released to 
school personnel only on a ‘need to know’ basis.”168  The Court also 
emphasized (as it had in the other drug testing cases) that the tests “are not 
turned over to any law enforcement authority,” and indeed, in Earls itself, 
could not even lead to “the imposition of discipline or have any academic 
consequences.”169  
The same kinds of privacy safeguards have likewise received emphasis 
from some of the courts permitting the collection of DNA—and creation of 
DNA profiles—from individuals arrested for felonies.  Consider, for 
example, United States v. Mitchell, in which the Third Circuit held that it 
was permissible for the federal government to collect DNA and create 
computerized DNA profiles from individuals indicted for (but not convicted 
                                                                                                                 
 162. 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
 163. Id. at 626. 
 164. 489 U.S. 656, 673 n.2 (1989). 
 165. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 166. Id. at 658. 
 167. Id. at 659 (internal citations omitted). 
 168. 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002). 
 169. Id. 
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of) a felony.170  As courts have done in the special needs cases, the court 
observed that the nature of information collected was not nearly as 
revealing as an unfettered chemical or biological testing and analysis 
regime.171  The DNA sample itself consisted of only a small fraction of the 
person’s DNA, containing only thirteen “junk DNA” loci, so-called because 
these parts of the DNA apparently do not provide code that shapes our 
biology, and thus cannot be used to learn anything about our biological 
make-ups.172  The patterns they contained were, like those in a fingerprint, 
likely unique to the individual who provided the DNA.173  In this sense, 
they are no more revealing than a fingerprint: they just provide some sense 
that the person who left his DNA at a particular location had contact with 
that place or item.174 
The Court also emphasized that it was “reassured by the numerous 
protections in place guarding against” government abuse of even the limited 
genetic information it had obtained.175  The federal DNA Act allowed the 
government to use the sample only for “four limited purposes.”176  It not 
only criminalized misuse of the DNA sample itself, but also “the analysis 
generated from the sample.”177  And the administrative rules and procedures 
applying the Act added a further layer of privacy protections.  It permitted 
only authorized individuals, approved by the FBI, to receive access to the 
                                                                                                                 
 170. 652 F.3d 387, 406-16 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 171. Id. at 400-01. 
 172. Id. at 400; see also Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The 
laboratory creates a profile only for identification purposes by analyzing thirteen genetic 
markers known as ‘junk DNA,’ which are not linked to any known genetic traits.”); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10:21-22, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 
12-207), 2013 WL 1842092, at *10 (argument of Katherine Winfree for Maryland) (“It’s 
looking only at 26 numbers that tell us nothing more about that individual.”).  Some 
commentators have raised doubts about whether junk DNA is truly lacking in sensitive 
medical information.  See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The 
Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 870 (2006) (noting that 
“some markers now thought to be meaningless may be (and have been) found to contain 
predictive medical information as the science progresses”); Alice Park, Junk DNA—Not So 
Useless After All, TIME, Sept. 6, 2012, available at http://healthland.time.com/2012/09/06/ 
junk-dna-not-so-useless-after-all/ (describing numerous recent studies showing that 
“stretches of seeming ‘junk’ DNA are actually the seat of crucial gene-controlling activity”). 
 173. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 401.  
 174. Id. at 400-01. 
 175. Id. at 407. 
 176. Id. at 408. 
 177. Id. at 407; see also Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1052 (noting strict limits on use of DNA 
information and criminal penalties in California law for violating these limits); Oral 
Argument, supra note 172, at 16:7-8 (“The sample cannot be looked at as a matter of law.”). 
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“Combined DNA Index System” [or CODIS] where the computer record of 
the DNA profile was stored.178  Thus, to the extent DNA collection under 
the Act raised graver privacy worries than the more familiar fingerprinting 
of arrested individuals, such worries were—in the court’s view—largely 
eliminated by statutory and administrative mechanisms which, taken 
together, prevented the government from learning any more about an 
individual from DNA data than they could from fingerprints.179 
This is not to say that such minimization has been demanded.  It has 
rather been an optional component of the free form balancing test for 
special needs cases mentioned earlier, wherein the courts weigh the 
government’s interest in a search against the privacy harm it causes.  Thus, 
in Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court upheld Maryland’s procedures for 
taking DNA from arrestees and found it was constitutional because—like 
routine fingerprinting of an arrestee—it was an acceptable method of 
assuring adequate “identification” of the arrestee, and the Court said little 
about the procedural protections in Maryland’s DNA Act.180  The Court has 
likewise been willing to let the government dispense—in some special 
needs cases—with procedural protection it has emphasized in others.181   
However, legislators might require the procedural protections of the kind 
the Court has refused to require in the special needs cases.  The Standards 
already provide some hints as to how lawmakers might do so in the sections 
on de-identification, retention and maintenance, and disclosure and 
dissemination. 
The section on de-identification proposes one “minimization” method 
that can, in a sense, be substituted for the normal probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion, or relevance requirement.  In short, as long as police 
adopt procedures and use technologies that strip (and keep out) any 
personally identifying information from the records they are examining, 
they are free to examine even “highly private” and “moderately private” 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 399-400. 
 179. Id. at 407. 
 180. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1976-77 (2013). 
 181. Compare Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 661 n.1 (1989) 
(noting that under HHS regulations an employee is required to provide prescription 
information “only after he is notified that his specimen tested positive for illicit drugs, at 
which time the Medical Review Officer reviews all records made available by the employee 
to determine whether the positive indication could have been caused by lawful use of 
drugs”), with Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 659 (1995) (finding no 
problem where the school required students to submit prescription information “in advance” 
of the test and allowed the information to be seen by school officials and not simply medical 
personnel). 
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records without meeting any kind of individualized suspicion.182  All that is 
needed in such a case is an “official certification” from the agency.183  Of 
course, this de-identification rule is not intended to provide an end run 
around the normal court order requirement.  If police wish to reconnect this 
de-identified data to any identifiable individual, they must first obtain the 
authorization that would normally be required for that type of data, given its 
level of privacy (i.e., highly, moderately, or minimally private).184 
The section on retention and maintenance likewise demands protections 
paralleling, in many respects, the privacy protection measure I discussed 
above in the Federal DNA Act.185  It requires among other things, that 
legislation protect against “unauthorized access”186 and place limits on the 
personnel who have the required authorization, and that “[m]oderately and 
highly protected” records should be “subject to audit logs recording all 
attempted and successful access” and “destroyed according to an 
established schedule.”187  The section on disclosure bars further 
dissemination of the records police require, except for enumerated 
purposes, such as for purposes of the case the police are investigating, or in 
certain “other government investigations, or parallel civil investigations.”188  
For example, even when records are not de-identified, courts might 
demand that police find a way to minimize the amount of unnecessary 
information they obtain or, by subjecting the information first to certain 
algorithms in computers, the amount of information that any human views.  
After all, it is arguably not as invasive to have our data subjected to 
machine analysis as it is to have it subjected to analysis by a person.  Just as 
wiretaps might meet minimization requirements, so too might third party 
record searches. 
Alternatively, courts might allow police to use certain highly or 
moderately private data that they analyze only to address problems of a 
limited kind.  This kind of limit combines the ends and means components 
of scrutiny-based review.  Police might be barred, for example, from 
obtaining DNA records used to provide evidence of serious criminal 
activity and then repurposing them to investigate a less serious offense. 
                                                                                                                 
 182. STANDARD 25-5.6.   
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 170-179. 
 186. STANDARD 25-6.1(a)(i). 
 187. STANDARD 25-6.1(b). 
 188. STANDARD 25-6.2. 
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In any event, my central point here is that apart from simply relying on 
the familiar categories of protection one finds in the probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion, and relevance standards, and then supplementing 
them with limited use and disclosure protections, the Standards’ writers 
(and the legislators who follow their lead) could build upon the important 
work they began in setting forth such use and disclosure requirements and 
shape them into more robust means requirements, akin to those courts use 
in constitutional scrutiny-based review. 
Conclusion 
In her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor 
wrote that in light of modern technological developments, “it may be 
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”189  Consequently, just as the Supreme Court in Katz v. United 
States decided to heed Justice Brandeis’s call forty years earlier to make 
wiretapping a subject of Fourth Amendment protection, it may, as Justice 
Sotomayor indicates, turn more than eighty years later to Justice Brandeis’s 
prophetic worry that future technologies would pull “secret papers” out of 
well-guarded drawers and store them instead in places where they are easier 
for government to access on a whim, such as today’s electronic, third party 
owned servers. 
However, until that time comes, legislators can move to fill the gap, and 
the Standards can provide these legislators with an admirable template on 
which to do so.  The Standards provide an appealing, orderly framework for 
protecting the vast territory of third party information, and rather than 
focusing single-mindedly on individuals’ privacy interests, instead attend to 
“the critical need for striking the delicate balance between law 
enforcement’s legitimate need for access to such records and the privacy 
rights of the subjects of those records.”190 
My point in this article has been that while the Standards have 
understandably turned legal thinkers’ attention from constitutional law 
questions to legislation, it would be good for legislators to keep in mind—
as they apply and elaborate upon the Standards’ invaluable framework—
that they might add to this framework by continuing to think about realms 
of constitutional law outside of the Fourth Amendment.  In particular, 
courts’ long-standing jurisprudence on heightened scrutiny might provide 
                                                                                                                 
 189. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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important guidance both on what sphere of informational lives deserve the 
strongest (default) privacy protections and on the form that those 
protections should take when it is important to give government some 
access to crucial investigation-related information while continuing to 
minimize the damage they do to privacy interests. 
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